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ABSTRACT Carbon pricing is one of the most politically important approaches for the mitiga-
tion of climate change in the world today. Most political actors who are not committed to cli-
mate change denial favor carbon pricing, either as emissions trading or carbon taxation. In
this article, I argue that carbon pricing should be considered unfair in most of its forms. I pre-
sent a line of criticism called the Unfair Burdens Argument. It states that the most politi-
cally relevant ways to price carbon needlessly burden the less affluent more than the more
affluent. This is unfair because, among other things, the more affluent have on average done
more to create the problem of climate change in the first place. Principles for the fair distribu-
tion of burdens under climate change mitigation like the Polluter Pays Principle, which were
thought to support carbon pricing, turn out to speak against it, when interpreted properly.
Although the Unfair Burdens Argument on its own cannot show that carbon pricing is imper-
missible, it offers important clues for what a morally permissible form of climate change miti-
gation would look like.
1. Introduction
Currently, forms of carbon pricing are the global frontrunners among policies aiming
to mitigate climate change. Those parts of the political world that are not committed
to outright climate change denial almost universally pull into this direction or at least
indicate that if they were to lend their support to a robust form of climate change miti-
gation, carbon pricing would be their chosen means. Some of the most important cli-
mate policies to date have been forms of carbon pricing. Both the political and the
scientific discourse of the last decade have been heavily marked by discussions about
market-based measures like emissions trading and carbon taxation. The trend towards
carbon pricing has been further consolidated by the decision of the Chinese govern-
ment to implement a national system of carbon pricing in the form of emissions trad-
ing.1 Once in full flow, it will cover roughly half of the Chinese economy, the largest
source of greenhouse gases on the planet.2
Given its high political relevance, it is of special interest to gain a better understand-
ing of carbon pricing. This article aims to contribute to this goal by raising and subse-
quently discussing one moral argument against carbon pricing that I name the Unfair
Burdens Argument. It aims to show that the most politically relevant forms of carbon
pricing should be considered unfair. They needlessly burden the less affluent more
than the more affluent. This will turn out to be incompatible with plausible principles
for the just distribution of burdens in climate change mitigation. The argument builds
on the idea that ‘being burdened’, at least in the context of climate change mitigation,
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should not be equated with ‘being financially burdened’. Prominent principles for the
distribution of burdens in climate change mitigation gain plausibility under such an
understanding of what it means to be burdened.
The Unfair Burdens Argument begins with cases like the following:
Montgomery: Montgomery is a very affluent person with a luxurious and very
emissions intensive lifestyle. He has his own private jet, several sports cars,
multiple mansions and is an avid consumer of all the things to his liking –
and he boasts a massive bank account. The latter is somewhat burdened after
a form of carbon pricing is introduced. Due to his way of living, he has to
pay much more for his continued emissions than most people do. However,
because of the depth of his financial assets, the payments do not compel him
to make significant lifestyle changes. Emitting in larger quantities may have
become a luxury, but he is the kind of person who can easily afford such lux-
uries.
Cases like that of Montgomery exemplify the observation that carbon pricing, at least
in many of its forms, might not force everybody into behavioral change.3 Since it only
incentivizes behavioral change, there is the possibility that some people might resist
the incentive by paying the price for their own personal business as usual. They con-
tinue to be ‘environmental renegades’, to borrow a term from Goodin.4 This observa-
tion gives rise to a fairness-based argument against carbon pricing.
Three notable caveats: First, carbon pricing will be examined as a stand-alone policy
tool in this article, not as part of a wider policy package. Since carbon pricing is by far
the most prominent climate change mitigation policy tool, I take this to be a worth-
while endeavor, even though carbon pricing is in fact likely to be accompanied by
other measures. Second, the approach to climate ethics used in this article is, in
Simon Caney’s terms, atomist and isolationist.5 This is because I evaluate carbon pric-
ing policies in the light of several well-known principles that only concern the distribu-
tion of responsibilities in solving a particular problem. Third, nonrevenue generating
versions of carbon pricing, such as the free allocation of tradable emission permits, will
be excluded from the discussion in this article. They merit discussion, but they are
too different from revenue-generating models, that are in any case more politically rel-
evant, to feature here.
2. Carbon Pricing – A Short Introduction
Before I present my argument, a short introduction into the idea and practice of car-
bon pricing is in order. Carbon pricing is an umbrella term for a variety of policy tools
whose stated aim is to contribute to the mitigation of climate change. Their distinctive
feature compared to other mitigation policies is that, at least on the level of the indi-
vidual emitter, they incentivize emissions abatement rather than directly prescribe it.
They do so by putting a price on the emission of greenhouse gases; or in shorthand:
they put a price on carbon. Two general ways to price carbon have come to dominate
the discussion: emissions trading and carbon taxation. They will be the topic of this
article.
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Emissions trading is arguably the more prominent of the two ways to price carbon.
Prime examples are the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in some US states.6 The first step in
setting up an emissions trading market usually consists in the specification of an emis-
sions cap. In a second step, a number of emissions permits (usually one for every ton
of CO2e allowed under the cap) are created and allocated. The allocation typically
happens in the form of an auction, generating revenue for the state. Finally, the per-
mits are made tradable. Once the permit is used to cover the correspondent emission,
it has to be surrendered. There are, of course, countless ways to tweak this basic sys-
tem. The basic idea remains the same, though: a tight cap with a price on permits cre-
ates an incentive to emit less for all parties within the scope of the trading regime.
Schemes like that are also called ‘cap and trade’.7
Carbon taxation has also been implemented in some countries, although these pro-
jects can’t rival the aforementioned emissions trading schemes in size.8 Sweden is a
prominent example of a country that has introduced a carbon tax. Here is how carbon
taxation usually works: a central authority sets a fixed price per ton of carbon dioxide
equivalent that has to be paid whenever said quantity of greenhouse gases is emitted.
The payment takes the form of a tax. No fixed cap is created, although the tax rate
usually can be understood to reflect a certain emissions target. All taxation schemes
involve the generation of revenue for the state or whatever authority sets the tax. Since
every emitted unit of greenhouse gas effects, a payment by the emitter, a clear incen-
tive to emit less is created.
Carbon can be priced upstream or downstream under both emissions trading and
carbon taxation. More upstream models would make fossil fuel extractors or industrial
emitters pay the price on carbon. More downstream models would focus on retailers
or the consumers themselves. Since all of these variants are expected to function in a
way so that the tax incidence ultimately falls to the individual consumer, I will not fur-
ther differentiate between them.9 The versions of carbon pricing discussed in this arti-
cle all generate revenue for the state. This will be important when discussing the
revenue-generating function as one possible means to ensure a fair distribution of bur-
dens in Section 4 of this article.
3. The Unfair Burdens Argument
The aim of this section is to provide a fairness-based argument against politically rele-
vant forms of carbon pricing. The next section will feature a discussion of whether all
forms of carbon pricing are subject to the same argument. I will provide the argument
upfront and discuss its premises one after the other.
The Unfair Burdens Argument goes like this:
(1) More affluent individuals are burdened less under politically relevant forms of car-
bon pricing than less affluent individuals.
(2) If a carbon mitigation policy burdens more affluent individuals less than less afflu-
ent individuals, it is unfair.
(3) Therefore: politically relevant forms of carbon pricing are unfair. (1., 2.)
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The argument is deductively valid. I will discuss its premises in the above-mentioned
order. One qualification upfront: the Unfair Burdens Argument is an argument on real-
world matters. It is under these real-world conditions alone that I take its premises to
be true.
A note on which forms of carbon pricing are targeted by the argument is in order: I
will work under the assumption that carbon pricing policies which make the more
affluent pay vastly more per unit of emissions than the less affluent are unlikely to be
implemented. They need therefore not be targeted by the Unfair Burdens Argument. I
will elaborate on this matter in Section 4. I will further assume that carbon pricing
policies that involve a uniform price per ton of CO2e for all emitters belong to the cat-
egory of politically relevant carbon pricing policies. For the remainder of this section,
I will understand the argument as criticizing the forms of carbon pricing policies that
involve a uniform price. Section 4 will explain how far the argument applies to policies
with diverging prices for different emitters. Finally, the Unfair Burdens Argument targets
only those policies that involve a price on carbon that is high enough to make a real
difference for climate change mitigation. Less robust policies are nonstarters from a
fairness perspective anyway.
3.1. Premise 1
The first premise states that more affluent individuals are burdened less under politi-
cally relevant forms of carbon pricing than less affluent individuals. The key concept
used in premise 1 is obviously ‘being burdened’. So what does it mean to be burdened
by carbon pricing? One could think that somebody is burdened by carbon pricing if
and only if (and to the degree that) she needs to make extra payments because of the
policy. If that were the case, premise 1 would in all likelihood be false. However, inter-
preting ‘being burdened’ as ‘being financially burdened’ is not convincing. Remember
the case of Montgomery. He pays substantial sums of money as a result of carbon
pricing but can continue his luxurious and emission-intensive lifestyle. Can he right-
fully be counted as being burdened by carbon pricing? One could answer that yes,
maybe the payments he has to make should prevent us from saying that Montgomery
isn’t burdened at all. After all, we can assume that he would prefer to emit for free,
just like he did before. But compare the case of Montgomery with the following one:
Homer: Homer is neither poor nor very affluent. Like most people in industri-
alized countries he emits significant amounts of greenhouse gases, although
not nearly as much as even more affluent people. The introduction of a car-
bon pricing scheme does not plunge him into existential danger, but he has
to make substantial changes to his way of living in order not to become poor.
For example, he has to scratch his annual holiday air travel and has to cut
down on his car travels, which formed an important part of his daily life. Like
most people in similar situations, he does not welcome those changes but
experiences them as burdensome. He liked his old way of living, but simply
can no longer afford it.
Homer makes substantially less payments as a result of carbon pricing than Mont-
gomery. At the same time, I take it to be evident that we should consider him to be
much more burdened by the policy. After all, Montgomery hardly notices the impact
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of the policy on his way of living while Homer must make sacrifices. Hence interpret-
ing ‘being burdened’ as ‘being financially burdened’ is not adequate.
Homer might not belong to the group of people most heavily burdened by carbon
pricing. After all, we can easily picture examples of even less affluent people who are
burdened by carbon pricing more heavily than Homer is. Think of someone who is no
longer able to afford those emissions necessary to provide basic necessities like food
and shelter. Henry Shue calls these emissions ‘subsistence emissions’.10 However,
since it might be possible for a carbon pricing scheme to exempt the least affluent and
some basic goods and services without endangering the overall effectiveness of the pol-
icy, I focus on the example of Homer as a contrast to Montgomery. He is neither very
affluent nor among the least affluent. People like him must be burdened by carbon
pricing for it to be effective.
With that out of the way, let us take a look at some more promising candidates for
what it means to be burdened by carbon pricing. What should be our ‘currency of jus-
tice’? Some candidates are apparent: loss of hedonic quality, diminished preference
satisfaction, and a loss of (sets of) capabilities or functionings.11 Instead of deciding
on one of these conceptions, I am going to make an ecumenical argument: all of these
plausible conceptions of what it means to be burdened by carbon pricing converge
insofar as more affluent people will typically be considered to be less burdened by the
forms of carbon pricing targeted by the Unfair Burdens Argument than less affluent peo-
ple.
This correlation might be at its clearest if we assume the capabilities approach pro-
vides the correct understanding of what it means to be burdened. Less affluent people
will likely be restricted in at least some of their capabilities or functionings as a result
of carbon pricing.12 For example, many less affluent people will have to cut down on
their car travels as a result of robust carbon pricing until electric cars (powered by
green energy) will be cheap and practical enough. Being able to use a car as a means
of personal transportation is still of paramount importance for the social lives of many
people outside urban centers. And to engage in various forms of social interaction is a
part of one of the core capabilities according to Nussbaum.13 More affluent people,
on the other hand, will be able to substitute lifestyle changes with financial payments
to a higher degree, thereby minimizing the loss of capabilities or functionings. The car
travel case is just one example, but it can be generalized: less affluent people are
forced into lesser lifestyle changes under carbon pricing and are therefore less likely to
lose capabilities or functionings.14 They are, therefore, less burdened according to the
capabilities approach.
Estimating who will suffer greater hedonic losses or more substantially diminished
preference satisfaction is naturally somewhat harder to do. This is because these cur-
rencies of justice have a less tangible connection to the observable characteristics of
one’s life. However, some points speak in favor of the less affluent being burdened
more by carbon pricing according to these theories as well. First of all, the observation
that less affluent people will typically be forced into less substantial lifestyle changes
seems, once again, significant. Ceteris paribus we can expect those people to suffer
more who will not be able to retain their way of living rather than those who can keep
on going about their business as they did before. And since we can expect that peo-
ple’s lifestyle choices roughly reflect their preferences, forced lifestyle changes will tend
to frustrate those preferences. True, forced monetary payments tend to frustrate
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preferences as well. But the following seems roughly right: more and more substantial
preferences are frustrated if you are forced to alter your way of living than when you
need to make monetary payments but can go on living like before.
Second, even if the more affluent will need to change their behavior as well, they
will usually have a greater selection of comparable substitutes open to them. Even if a
more affluent person can no longer afford to drive her emissions-intensive sports car,
she is more likely to be able to substitute it with an electric sports car. This change is
unlikely to result in significant hedonic losses or diminished preference satisfaction, in
any case less so than having to cut down on your driving altogether.
Third, and this applies to the hedonic understanding of burdens in particular, the
emissions-intensive luxuries that more affluent people are likely to give up as a conse-
quence of carbon pricing typically improve people’s well-being to a lesser degree than
the more basic goods, services, and activities that less affluent people may have to for-
sake. There is a well-known diminishing marginal utility to consumption that is likely
to result in more affluent people being less burdened than less affluent people even if
they can’t substitute the goods, services, and activities they can no longer afford. What
more affluent people lose therefore seems less important for a person’s well-being than
what less affluent people lose. To be clear, whether cutting down on these luxuries
goes along with smaller hedonic losses than cutting down on more basic goods, ser-
vices, and activities is not directly implied by the decreasing marginal utility of con-
sumption. After all, the negative feeling of losing something (rather than not having
something in the first place) might distort the relation. But the general relation still
seems plausible. Having to sell your second car is a smaller loss than having to sell
your first car. Going on holiday in the Mediterranean instead of the Maldives (if they
still exist) is a smaller loss than not being able to afford a holiday at all instead of fly-
ing to the Mediterranean.
To sum up, I take there to be a strong case for the more affluent being burdened
less by carbon pricing than the less affluent. The most plausible conceptions of what it
means to be burdened all point in this direction.
It is important to note just how modest this thesis is. For the purposes of my argu-
ment, it suffices if there is a general positive correlation between ‘being burdened less’
and ‘being more affluent’. Anything stronger, for example an ‘if and only if (and to
the degree that)’-relation, is not necessary, as will become clear in the discussion of
premise 2. This means that I don’t need to deny that there can and will be counterex-
amples to the correlation. Imagine a version of the Montgomery case in which even
the loss of small, inconsequential sums of money is felt as very painful by him, maybe
because he simply is a curmudgeon. Or a version of Homer in which the forced
behavioral change makes him embrace his local community more and ultimately
improves his social life. At least under some of the more plausible understandings of
‘being burdened’, this version of Montgomery must count as heavily burdened and
Homer as lightly burdened or not burdened at all. As long as these are exceptions to
the rule rather than the rule itself, the justification of premise 1 still stands.
3.2. Premise 2
Premise 2 states that carbon mitigation policies that burden the more affluent less than
the less affluent are unfair. This is for two reasons: first, because burdening the more
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affluent less than the less affluent stands in conflict with plausible moral principles for
the distribution of burdens in the context of climate change mitigation and, second,
because our intuitive verdict corroborates premise 2.
Plausible moral principles for the distribution of burdens in the context of climate
change mitigation support premise 2. One of the most prominent ideas for the distri-
bution of burdens under climate change mitigation is the idea that those who had a
bigger share in creating a problem should bear bigger burdens in solving the problem
than those who did less to create the problem. This line of thought is frequently
expressed in the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) and will turn out to support the truth
of premise 2. I will first elaborate on why the PPP supports premise 2 before com-
menting on the Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP) and the Ability to Pay Principle
(APP), the PPP’s chief rivals. There are good reasons to think that the rationales
behind these two other principles support premise 2 as well. Since the PPP, BPP,
and APP are by far the most prominent principles within the literature on who
should play what part in mitigating climate change, I take premise 2 to be well-sup-
ported.
First, the PPP: did the more affluent have and do they continue to have a bigger
share in causing climate change? An affirmative answer to this question is supported
by the recent studies on carbon inequality by Oxfam and Chancel/Piketty. The
authors’ first major finding is that carbon emissions are distributed unevenly among
the global population. They both have found what is called the ‘ten-fifty relation-
ship’. Ten percent of the global population is responsible for half of the global emis-
sions.15
Who are those individuals that emit much more than the global average? The
answer is: more affluent individuals. There is a strong correlation between ‘being
more affluent’ and ‘higher emissions’. While this correlation is, of course, not per-
fect, it is pointed out as significant by both Oxfam and Chancel/Piketty: the richest
10% of individuals are responsible for half the global emissions.16 Hardly any histori-
cal data on emissions by individuals exist, but I don’t see any reason to doubt the
positive correlation between affluence and emissions held during the last couple of
decades.17
Now, onto the normative part of premise 2: climate change mitigation will burden
some individuals. While burden-free scenarios are imaginable, they are either non-
starters from a fairness perspective or very unlikely to happen. Compensating burdens
to the current generation by increased borrowing from future generations (who are
themselves compensated by the reduction of the severity of climate change they will
have to endure) belongs to the first category.18 As John Broome points out, this is
effectively a case of potential victims of climate change bribing potential culprits not to
harm them.19 Instant revolutions of low-carbon technologies or a scenario in which
everyone is perfectly happy to change his or her behavior belong to the second cate-
gory. Hence, people will have to change their behavior on a great scale and, as was
argued in the discussion on premise 1, this will burden them.
Given that burdens will occur under climate change mitigation efforts such as car-
bon pricing, how should they be distributed? One very prominent idea is that the dif-
fering degrees of contribution to climate change should determine the distribution of
burdens. The Polluter Pays Principle is the most frequent expression of this thought.
In the words of Roser and Seidel:
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Polluter Pays Principle (PPP): A distributive principle according to which
agents should bear the burdens of addressing a problem in proportion to their
contribution to causing the problem.20
What needs to be noted is that Roser and Seidel, and other authors who have written
on the PPP in the context of climate change, may have had a different interpretation
of ‘burden’ in mind than I do. Hence, they may not necessarily agree that contribution
to climate change should play a role in the distribution of burdens as I understand the
term. The term ‘pays’ in ‘polluter pays’ certainly suggests a different concept of bur-
den that more closely aligns with monetary payments. However, as I argued, other
conceptions of what it means to be burdened are more plausible. If the PPP should
serve as a plausible principle for the distribution of burdens, we should understand it
as employing these conceptions. If burdens need to be allocated, they should be allo-
cated in a way so that the bigger contributors to the problem should bear bigger bur-
dens than smaller contributors.21 Those who have emitted more in the past
(presumably after some initial date at which excusable ignorance could no longer be
claimed) should bear bigger burdens. I therefore take it to be the case that a plausible
understanding of the PPP supports premise 2.
That is not to say, however, that carbon pricing is the only kind of climate change
mitigation policy that stands in conflict with the PPP. But finding that some forms
of carbon pricing conflict with a plausible understanding of the PPP is of special
interest. This is for several reasons: first, because carbon pricing has a high political
relevance; second, because the conflict between carbon pricing and the distribution
of burdens demanded by the PPP seems very substantial. It’s not just that bigger
contributors aren’t burdened more. They are burdened less than smaller contributors
under carbon pricing. The third reason is because the PPP is typically thought to
support carbon pricing.22 The Unfair Burdens Argument can consequently be under-
stood as an attempt to show that carbon pricing is indeed in conflict with what was
thought to be carbon pricing’s moral foundation if we interpret the PPP in the way I
have argued.
As far as I can see, there is no principled opposition to the idea that the degree of
contribution to climate change should play a role in the distribution of burdens under
climate change mitigation. Those authors that criticize the PPP as the sole principle on
the distribution of burdens under climate change mitigation usually want to have it
accompanied by other principles rather than abolished altogether.23 For example, they
point to the fact that a lot of emitters were excusably ignorant about the effects of their
emissions until, say, the 1980s or even the early 1990s.24 Or they point out that it
would be too harsh to place substantial burdens on impoverished former high emit-
ters.25 None of these problems of the PPP are pertinent when discussing premise 2,
though. More affluent people have emitted in large quantities long after they could no
longer be excusably ignorant, and more affluent people are by definition not impover-
ished. The PPP is therefore a plausible principle for the distribution of burdens in the
context of climate change mitigation, and it supports premise 2: even if it might not
seem unfair that more affluent people are burdened less under carbon pricing than less
affluent people, it certainly turns out to be unfair if we keep in mind that it was, by
and large, the more affluent people who have contributed more to the problem of cli-
mate change.26
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Now let us have a quick look at the most prominent alternatives to the PPP, the
Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP) and the Ability to Pay Principle (APP).27 There are
reasons to think they support premise 2 as well. First, the BPP: who are the people
who have benefited the most from emitting substantial quantities of greenhouse gases?
While the answer to this question clearly depends on what interpretation of ‘to benefit’
is chosen, it seems that ‘more affluent people’ is the correct answer under most plausi-
ble interpretations. Yet again, authors subscribing to the BPP might not necessarily
share the understanding of ‘being burdened’ advocated for in this article, but the ratio-
nale behind the BPP is applicable and supports premise 2.
The APP is harder to assess. This is why I will discuss it in more detail. In its most
general form, it states that those with a greater ability to bear burdens should bear big-
ger burdens than those with a smaller ability to bear burdens. What does it mean to
have ‘a greater ability to bear burdens’? If we measure burdens in monetary terms
alone, the more affluent are usually understood to have a greater ability to be bur-
dened (i.e. to pay). Because they have more of the resource we measure burdens in,
they can more easily do with less than people who have less of the resource in the first
place. Hence we should burden the more affluent more than the less affluent.
I argued in discussing premise 1 that we should measure burdens not in monetary
terms, but according to one of the other more plausible currencies of justice (hedonic
quality of life, preference satisfaction, capabilities or functionings). These currencies of
justice, of course, can not only be used to determine whether (and to what degree)
someone is burdened but also how well off that person is in general. Now, what does
it mean to have a greater ability to bear burdens according to these currencies? I think
the most plausible answer is: those who are better off according to the chosen cur-
rency of justice have a greater ability to bear burdens. Just as the rich have a greater
ability to pay just because they have more money, people who are, for example, better
off according to hedonism have a greater ability to bear the burden of a somewhat
reduced quality of life simply because their current quality of life is so high.
The next question is: who will count as being better off according to the three cur-
rencies of justice named in this article? I argue that even under this wider understand-
ing of ‘being burdened’ (compared with the monetary one) more affluent people will
typically count as being better off than less affluent people. For example, more affluent
people will usually have a wider set of capabilities or functionings and are thus better
off according to the capabilities approach. Estimating who will typically count as being
better off according to hedonism or a preference-based approach is harder to do. This
is because one’s quality of life understood in these terms is far more difficult to mea-
sure. However, research indicates that there is at least some correlation between rising
affluence and being better off according to these metrics as well.28 Once again, it is
therefore the more affluent people who must be burdened more in order to distribute
burdens fairly. Since this is not what politically relevant forms of carbon pricing do,
the APP deems them unfair.
Why should we believe that the APP, combined with one of the three currencies of
justice, is a plausible principle? Why should we burden the better off more than the
worse off even if we abstract from questions of responsibility for climate change and
the benefits received from past emissions? One possible underlying justification of the
APP is prioritarian. There is a special moral relevance to keeping the burdens on the
worse off small, and this special moral relevance justifies higher burdens for the better
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off. This need not apply to every case, for example, when we can massively reduce the
overall amount of burdens by burdening the worse off more, but it applies across a
wide tableau of cases. I take it that such a mildly prioritarian position is of great plau-
sibility. However, a less demanding form of the APP that merely demands that more
affluent people are not burdened less than less affluent people will reach the same nega-
tive verdict on politically relevant forms of carbon pricing. This is because, as I argued
in premise 1, these policies actually burden more affluent people less than less affluent
people. Hence even if one thinks that burdens in climate change mitigation should be
distributed equally, carbon pricing will turn out to be unfair in its politically relevant
forms.29
Summing up, it can be said that the rationales behind the most prominent princi-
ples for the distribution of burdens under climate change mitigation all point in the
direction of burdening the more affluent more (or at least not less) than the less afflu-
ent. Burdening them less would be unfair.30
This finding fits with our moral intuition. If, for example, we keep in mind that the
vast majority of more affluent individuals bear a greater responsibility for the problem
of climate change than less affluent individuals, any mitigation policy that burdens the
more affluent less than the less affluent really seems unfair. Whether a policy can be
considered fair if it burdens the more affluent more than the less affluent and makes
no exceptions for affluent low emitters is a different question. But any policy that as a
general rule correlates ‘smaller burden in solving the problem’ with ‘greater contribu-
tion to the problem’ must surely be considered unfair. Reflecting upon representative
examples like those of Homer and Montgomery further corroborates this finding.
3.3. An Exception to Premise 2
There is one notable exception to the rule stated in premise 2. If no burdens are lifted
from the less affluent by burdening the more affluent more, it may not be unfair to
burden the more affluent less than the less affluent. One might argue that burdening
the more affluent more than the less affluent is justified even in such a case because
the more affluent ought to be punished for their high emissions during the last dec-
ades. That would be a much stronger premise than what I intend to state in premise
2; hence the inclusion of this exception. Since it weakens rather than strengthens pre-
mise 2 for which I have already argued, I see no need to provide further justification
for it.
I argue that this exception is not pertinent to the case at hand. Reducing the bur-
dens on less affluent individuals by burdening the more affluent more is possible
under those carbon pricing schemes that burden the more affluent less than the less
affluent. I think this should be uncontroversial. There simply is no plausible explana-
tion why it should be the case that pricing schemes that burden the more affluent less
than the less affluent lead to a maximum burden reduction for the less affluent.
Bluntly speaking: making life easier for the rich than for the poor is not the best way
to help the poor. If people like Montgomery were kept from emitting staggering
amounts of greenhouse gases, that could – not must, but could – reduce the burdens
less affluent people have to bear. While shifting burdens need not be a zero-sum game,
that is, not every burden placed on more affluent people will automatically reduce a
burden on less affluent people, there seems to be a general possibility to reduce the
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burdens on less affluent people by burdening the more affluent more compared with
the distribution of burdens under some forms of carbon pricing.
This concludes the discussion of the Unfair Burdens Argument. If its premises are
plausible, it establishes the truth of the conclusion that some forms of carbon pricing
are indeed unfair. They needlessly burden those people who have contributed the
most to climate change during the last couple of decades, the more affluent, less than
the less affluent. If we accept this line of argument, we must deem some of the most
politically relevant forms of carbon pricing unfair. Is this enough to make them
morally impermissible all things considered? I have not argued for this conclusion and
will not do so. How unfair must a policy with the potential to successfully mitigate cli-
mate change be in order to be impermissible? That is a next-to-impossible question to
answer.31 I will therefore stop short of making an all-things-considered judgment on
the permissibility of those forms of carbon pricing targeted by the argument.
4. Are All Forms of Carbon Pricing Subject to the Unfair Burdens
Argument?
The Unfair Burdens Argument presented in the last section of this article aimed to show
that some forms of carbon pricing are unfair. This naturally opens up the question
whether some other forms of carbon pricing are not unfair, or at least not for the rea-
sons given in the last section. What has been said so far is meant to apply to carbon
pricing policies that involve a uniform price per unit of emissions for all emitters.
Everybody pays the same sum for the same amount of CO2e. Proposals like that have
a high political relevance, but they are clearly not the only possible carbon pricing
option. An obvious next step is to look at carbon pricing schemes that involve different
prices on greenhouse gas emissions for different individuals.
There seem to be two different ways to implement varying carbon prices. First, one
could make different individuals pay different amounts for a single unit of emission in
the first place.32 A second way of implementing different carbon prices for different
individuals would be to make all people pay the same price on carbon upfront, but
reimburse different individuals to different degrees later on. These reimbursements
could come from the general national budget or more specifically from the revenue
generated by the carbon pricing schemes themselves. Using at least some of the rev-
enues from carbon pricing to ensure a fair distribution of burdens is a common pro-
posal in the literature.33
Now that I have sketched out how carbon pricing could involve varying carbon prices,
I will briefly argue for three theses. First, there are forms of carbon pricing involving dif-
ferent prices for different individuals that are not unfair in the same way that is pointed
out by the Unfair Burdens Argument. There are indeed some possible forms of carbon
pricing that burden the more affluent more than the less affluent and hence cannot be
targeted by the version of the Unfair Burdens Argument presented in the last section.
For example, consider an extremely progressive carbon tax proposal that forces the
most affluent to pay ten-thousand times more for the emission of a certain amount of
greenhouse gases than, let’s say, the least affluent 25%. The most affluent 1% pay
$100,000 per ton of CO2e, and the least affluent 25% pay $10. A very progressive dis-
tribution of tax burdens is chosen for those in between. If the distribution of financial
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payments between more affluent and less affluent is skewed extremely enough in the
direction of the more affluent, they will likely have to make more demanding changes
to their way of living than less affluent people. Consequently, they will in all likelihood
be considered to be burdened more heavily than less affluent people in the sense of
‘burden’ appropriate in the distribution of burdens in climate change mitigation. We
can therefore conclude that there is no principled reason why carbon pricing schemes
must always involve an unfair distribution of burdens.
Second, not all carbon pricing policies that involve a higher price per unit of emis-
sions for the more affluent than for the less affluent involve a fair distribution of bur-
dens. Some of them are still unfair in the way illustrated in the Unfair Burdens
Argument, although typically not as unfair as carbon pricing policies that involve the
same price per ton of CO2e for all individuals. Take, for instance, a slightly progres-
sive emissions trading scheme that makes the very affluent pay double the price per
unit of emissions than the least affluent, with a progressive rise in prices for those in
between. This might still result in more affluent people having to make smaller
changes in behavior than less affluent people. As long as wealth is more unevenly dis-
tributed than financial burdens under carbon pricing, the more affluent will be bur-
dened less. The fact that a pricing scheme can be considered progressive is therefore
not a sufficient condition for it being fair.
Also, one simple way to assure a fair distribution of burdens is blocked: one cannot
spare the less affluent from all burdens under carbon pricing. If only the more affluent
have to change their behavior, they will surely be more burdened than the less affluent.
Such a policy will, however, in all likelihood prove ineffective in mitigating climate
change. Not everybody has to change their way of living for a mitigation policy to be
successful, but exempting significant parts of society from having to make behavioral
changes is a recipe for failure even if those parts of society emit relatively little green-
house gases. This is troubling both for those policies that exempt the less affluent from
having to pay the price on carbon in the first place and for those policies that offer a
full (or near full) refund for less affluent individuals. Using some of the revenue from
carbon pricing to refund less affluent people can play a role in a fair and effective car-
bon pricing scheme, but too-generous refunds might threaten its effectiveness if they
allow too many individuals to keep on emitting like before.34
The third and final thesis is the least certain one. It states that more robust carbon
pricing policies that are likely to be implemented in the future will distribute burdens
in an unfair way. Predicting the future is a notoriously sketchy business, and there is
little reason to believe that philosophers are better at it than other people, so this last
thesis should be taken with more than just a grain of salt. The following seems plausi-
ble, though: carbon pricing policies that can be considered fair will make the very
affluent give up their emissions-intensive lifestyle. The most affluent 1%, for example,
would not be able to keep on emitting 300 tons of CO2e per year for long under such
a policy. Given the disproportionately high influence of very affluent people on policy
decisions in today’s political climate, one need not be a cynic to think that policies
that basically outlaw what we consider a very luxurious lifestyle or at least involve mas-
sive transfers of wealth for the short-term continuation of such a lifestyle have little
chance of being implemented.35
Another way of looking at it is this: by adjusting carbon pricing in a way that leads
to less uneven incentives to change behavior, we essentially make it mimic other policy
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proposals, especially carbon rationing, i.e. the allocation of nontradable emission per-
mits. The original idea behind carbon pricing was to couple the opportunity to emit
with the means for paying for these emissions. A policy with different carbon prices
for different individuals decouples these two things again. Those political actors who
liked the original idea behind carbon pricing are unlikely to support a version of car-
bon pricing that mimics carbon rationing and thereby abandons the original idea. So
while the Unfair Burdens Argument is an argument that only criticizes some forms of
carbon pricing (and does so for good reasons), one can add that all or at least most
forms of carbon pricing that have a good chance of being implemented fall within
those forms of carbon pricing targeted by the argument.
5. Conclusion
Greenhouse gas emissions must be reduced. That much should be clear. Carbon pricing
aims to reduce them by making them more expensive. Doing so, it links the ability to
continue with one’s current emission-intensive lifestyle to the ability to pay for it. Under
politically relevant forms of carbon pricing this leads to an unfair distribution of burdens.
It does so by needlessly burdening those individuals who have contributed the most to
climate change during the last couple of decades, the more affluent less than the less
affluent. The argument builds on the idea that ‘being burdened’, at least in the context
of climate change mitigation, should not be equated with ‘being financially burdened’.
While some other forms of carbon pricing cannot be said to distribute burdens in an
unfair way, they seem to have a smaller chance of being implemented.
Where does this leave us? As I have already said, carbon pricing may not be morally
impermissible all things considered even if the Unfair Burdens Argument succeeds. For
example, if it is the only politically feasible way to avert the worst of climate change,
we should arguably pursue it. Changing what is politically feasible is another option,
but this may take time – time we are running out of. Also, if it is true that the more
affluent will use their influence to block all climate policies that involve a fair distribu-
tion of burdens, this will apply to other climate policies as well. Hence it is unclear if
significantly fairer climate change mitigation policies will turn out to be politically fea-
sible. If they are not feasible, this essay must end on a pessimistic note. Carbon pric-
ing is no exception to the rule that politically feasible climate change mitigation
policies involve an unfair distribution of burdens.
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